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The Law and Economics of Vertical
Restrictions: A Relational Perspective
Victor P. Goldberg*
Vertical restrictions between franchisors and their dealers have
long been a thorny problem in antitrust law. Richard Posner's characterization of the case law as a "fiasco" and a "doctrinal shambles"' is
echoed by many other commentators.2 Perhaps partly because of the
intellectual confusion in the area, the Supreme Court recently made an
apparently sharp change in direction. In ContinentalT V, Inc. v. GTE

Sylvania Inc.3 the Court reversed the decade-old Schwinn 4 per se doctrine, holding that at least some vertical restrictions deserve a rule of
reason test. Whether this decision will prove a more durable precedent
than Schwinn remains to be seen. Robert Bork, an enthusiastic supporter of the overthrow of Schwinn, has counseled caution in projecting
the implications of GTE Sylvania,' and the FTC's interpretation of the
case in its decisions regarding territorial restrictions by soft drink bottlers suggests that the magnitude of the change from the Schwinn standard indeed might have been exaggerated.6 Even if GTE Sylvania is not
subsequently overturned, the next few years will see a continuing flow
of litigation to define the boundaries of the rule of reason test as applied in this new context.
To understand the nature of the franchise relationship and the way
antitrust law deals with it, it is useful to depart somewhat from the
conventional analysis in the economics and law of contract, in which
* Professor of Economics, University of California (Davis). B.A. 1963, Oberlin College;
M.A. 1964, Ph.D. 1970, Yale University. Part of the research on this paper was performed while I
was visiting at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey.
1. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 166-67 (1976).

2. See, e.g., Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change. From White to Schwinn to
lere, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975); Handler, Twenty-Ffmh Annual Antitrust Review, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 415, 458-59 (1973); Pollack, Alternative DistributionMethods After Schwinn, 63
Nw. L. REv. 595 (1968); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV.243
(1975); Williams, Distributionand the Sherman Act-The Effects of GeneralMotors, Schwinn and
Sealy, 1967 DUKE L.J. 732.
3. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
4. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
5. Bork, VerticalRestraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171.
6. In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978); In re Pepsico, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 680 (1978). The
lone dissenter in these decisions stated: "[T]he majority decision comes close to establishing aper
se standard of illegality where territorial restraints are imposed by leading firms in an industry."
91 F.T.C. at 598 (Comm'r Clanton, dissenting).
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the archetypal transaction is the sale of a widget. In the franchise contract the parties enter into a long-term arrangement in which they interact, insulated to some degree from external market forces. Using Ian
Macneil's terminology, 7 it is profitable to view the franchise arrangement as a relational exchange rather than as a discrete transaction.
Traditional economic analysis focuses on the aggregation of transactions into markets; it generally ignores the nature of the individual
transaction and considers behavior within that relationship irrelevant.
From a relational exchange perspective, behavior within the relationship is an important element of concern. In part I, I develop the broad
elements of a relational exchange perspective. Part II fosters understanding and appreciation of this perspective by focusing on one particular element of relational exchange-the barriers to exit from the
relationship-and the means for altering those barriers. Part III demonstrates the impact of a relational exchange perspective on antitrust
analysis. Indeed, recognition of relational concepts in GTE Sylvania
led the Court to conclude that some vertical restrictions can be significant elements in an efficient marketing system. Nonetheless, a liberal
policy regarding vertical restrictions must be tempered by recognition
that private and social costs and benefits may not coincide. I therefore
close part III by briefly discussing a number of reasons for the possible
divergence of private and social efficiency.
Parts IV and V discuss the issue of relational governance, and
show it to be a natural extension of the relational exchange perspective.
In confronting and resolving conflicts of perceived legitimate interests,
courts often pursue relational governance goals, such as dealer protection. Part IV recognizes that courts must be able, when necessary, to
redefine rights in response to or in anticipation of changes in the perceived legitimacy of those rights. However, the unarticulatedpursuit of
relational governance goals has contributed significantly to the confusion in the case law. A relational exchange perspective demands articulation of those goals, which would inject some intellectual order into
the decisions. In part V, using as an example the goal of protecting
franchisees from termination, I suggest how antitrust laws might accommodate the pursuit of legitimate, articulated relational governance
goals.
7. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,Neoclassical,andRelationalContractLaw, 72 Nw. L. REv. 854 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Macneil,
Contracts]; Macneil, .4 Primerof Contract Planning,48 S. CAL. L. REv. 627 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Macneil, Primer];Macneil, The Many Futuresof Contracts,47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Macneil, Many Futures].

Vertical Restrictions
I.

Relational Exchange

Contracts often provide for long-term, complex relationships between the parties.8 Examples include long-term construction contracts,
requirements contracts, franchise agreements, warranties, country club
memberships, collective bargaining agreements, the complex network
of contracts that taken together make up the firm, government-funded
basic research projects, and, in a less commercial vein, marriage. Indeed, all social interaction takes place within an elaborate network of
relationships. Even an apparently simple contract between two parties
for the sale of the aforementioned widget, for example, is conditioned
by both legal and nonlegal relationships surrounding the contract. The
performance of the parties influences their reputation with each other
and with other potential trading partners. Furthermore, their conduct
is judged by standards that depend on past social relationships; in a
society in which parties presume others to be untrustworthy, exchange
will be much more difficult to arrange than in a society in which meeting reasonable contractual obligations is the norm. These past and future relational factors in turn both influence and are influenced by the
legal relationships within which the contract is embedded (including
the validity of the precontract title to both the widget and the cash).
If we are to make generalizations about exchange relationships,
this picture must be drastically simplified lest extraneous detail overwhelm us. Traditional economic analyses generally embody an implicit notion of contract that suppresses virtually all relational elements.
I will try to rectify this by presenting a stylized picture of exchange that
is simple enough to be tractable, yet is sufficiently complex to illustrate
the essential characteristics of relational exchange.9
8. The word "contract" can be misleading since it suggests the existence of a formal docu-

ment that accurately describes the relationship; in fact, there may not be a formal document, or
the formal document may bear little resemblance to the actual structure of the relationship. Mac-

neil includes all projections of exchange over the future in his definition of contract, see Macneil,
Many Futures,supra note 7, at 720, and the usage here is consistent with his. When it is not likely
to be confusing I will use "contract," "agreement," and "relationship" interchangeably.
9. I have developed aspects of the framework for this analysis in prior works. Goldberg,
Protectingthe Right to be Served by Public Utilities,in 1 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 145
(R. Zerbe, Jr. ed. 1979); Goldberg, Competitive Biddingand the Productionof PrecontractInformation, 8 BELL J. ECON. 250 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg, Competitive Bidding]; Goldberg,
Book Review, I HASTINOS INT'L COMp. L. REV. 215 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg, Book
Review]; Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract, 10 J. ECON. IssuES 45
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg, Expanded Theory of Contract]; Goldberg, Regulation and
Administered Contracts,7 BELL. J. ECON. 426 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg, Administered
Contracts]; Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance and the Federal Trade Commission: The Lenox
and Magnavox Cases (1979) (unpublished report to the FTC; copy on file at the Texas Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance].
For additional major developments of the relational framework, see 0. WILLIAMSON, MAR-
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Suppose that two parties at the formation stage of an agreement
contemplate entering a contract with an anticipated termination date.
They can, however, prematurely terminate the contract at various times
during the relationship. The parties have competing options available,
both at the formation stage and within the relationship. At the formation stage the parties choose rules to structure their relationship. The
choice of rules and of trading partners depends on the anticipated outcomes.
Traditional economic analysis generally ignores the nature of the
individual transaction and focuses attention on the aggregation of
transactions into markets. By working backwards it is possible to determine the type of exchange relations implicit in the standard analyses. These analyses implicitly assume that the state has specified rights
that it protects perfectly and costlessly, and that the state is a perfect
enforcer of all contracts. In the simplest case--contemporaneous exchange-the exchange is fully consummated at the formation stage.
This case, in principle, is no different from one in which the relation
takes place over a long period of time, but the outcomes are totally
independent of the behavior of the two parties themselves. The parties
bring the future into the present by acting on the basis of an anticipated
distribution of outcomes and attitudes toward risk. Instead of exchanging goods the parties traffic in contingent claims.
Outcomes, however, often depend upon the behavior of the parties. X may have agreed to subject himself to Y's discretionary power
concerning certain aspects of the agreement. X may find that the incentives change after the relationship has begun, moral hazard' ° being
one manifestation of this. Outcomes may depend on strategic behavior
of the parties. Suppose that as the relationship unfolds the terms on
which X and Y can deal with parties outside the relationship remain
the same as they were at the formation stage. That is, if customer X
faced four equally situated sellers at the formation stage, he would face
precisely the same situation once the relationship has begun; that Y
KETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical

Integration, 4ppropriableRent, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297
(1978); Macneil, Contracts, supra note 7; Macneil, Primer,supra note 7; Macneil, Many Futures,
supra note 7. See also Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations,22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, Transaction-CostEconomics]; Williamson, .4ssessing VerticalMarketRestrictions: AntitrustRam/fications ofthe Transaction
Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, Market Restrictions]; Williamson, FranchiseBiddingfor NaturalMonopolies-In Generaland WVth Respect to
C4TV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, FranchiseBidding].
10. "Moral hazard" refers to the modification in X's behavior that results from this change in
incentives. See Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REv. 941, 961 (1963).

Vertical Restrictions
won the initial contract would give it no advantage or disadvantage as
compared with its competitors in subsequent periods. If each party
faces the same competitive terms at all points within the relationship as
it did at the formation stage, then the long-term agreement is, in effect,
converted into a series of spot contracts.
Most standard economic analysis implicitly assumes that outcomes
depend only on exogenous risks, or that endogenous risks can be offset
by spot contracting." Macneil refers to this kind of exchange as being
in the "discrete transaction" mode.' 2 Treating exchange as a discrete
transaction directs attention to three types of questions at the formation
stage: (a) how do economic actors choose from an array of options?
(b) what market outcomes will result from the simultaneous choices of
individual actors? (c) how do outcomes depend upon the nature of
competition at the formation stage?
The discrete transaction is an ideal, never observed in the real
world. Nevertheless, it is an extremely useful analytic construct and
should properly be viewed as a special case-a subclass of exchange.
My emphasis on relational matters in this essay should not obscure the
fact that in many contexts explicit recognition of relational elements
adds heat but sheds no light. The question is not whether we should
suppress relational complexity in analysis; rather, the question is when.
In relational exchange, activity may to some degree be sheltered
from market forces. Sheltering may be externally imposed upon the
parties by law or custom. It may reflect the conscious decisions of the
parties to structure a relationship to take advantage of the opportunities
and account of the difficulties afforded by coordination and cooperation. Although in the discrete transaction framework behavior within
the relationship is irrelevant, in the relational exchange perspective it is
an important object of concern. This relational perspective leads to a
rather different set of questions than those raised by standard economic
analysis: (a) what determines the structure of a relationship? (b) how
will the structure and outcomes change as time passes? (c) what will be
the impact of these structuring decisions beyond the relationship (for
example, on market power or price flexibility)?
If parties were omniscient and saintly, the structuring of their relationship would present no difficulty. But, in fact, they must make their
decisions in a world in which information is imperfect and improvable
11. There are, of course, numerous exceptions. The analysis of moral hazard in the insurance context and of the internal organization of the firm are two significant ones. See Arrow,
supra note 10; Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
12. Macneil, Many Futures,supra note 7, at 693, 725.
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only at a price, and in which people behave strategically or opportunistically.13 Moreover, they must recognize that both legal and extralegal
enforcement of the agreement's terms by outside parties will be neither
perfect nor costless. The traditional static efficiency questions that concern economists will often be relatively unimportant. Rather, the structure will reflect a number of interests generally ignored in the discrete
transaction framework: enforcement, reliance, flexibility, and governance.
If we assume that the agreement reflects the balancing of the parties' interests given the tools available, their efficacy in different contexts, and the constraints facing the decisionmakers, then we have the
framework for a predictive model. Under conditions M we should expect to observe structure N. I am not going to pursue this line of inquiry directly here because it is tangential to my main purpose.
Nevertheless, some words of caution are in order. First, the parties can
select any one of a large number of apparently dissimilar devices to
pursue the same goal.14 The rich set of alternatives makes prediction of
the type of tool chosen a difficult task. Second, the parties can use a
particular tool for very different purposes."5 Third, it is essential to
recognize that the structure observed depends crucially on the sociolegal context. A particular structure does not arise in an aseptic, neutral setting. Therefore, attempts to explain that structure on narrow
economic grounds can be very misleading. For example, the widespread adoption of the practice of selling gasoline through independent
franchised dealers carrying a single brand of gasoline suggests that
there are strong economic reasons for oil companies to prefer this arrangement to full-fledged vertical integration. The analysis, however,
simply cannot ignore the fact that the widespread adoption of franchising in the late 1930s was also strongly motivated by a desire to avoid
chain store taxation, Social Security obligations, and labor legislation.16
13. For a detailed discussion of the factors that make relational exchange attractive, see 0.
supra note 9, ch. 2.
14. For example, X can protect his reliance on Y's continued supply of a good by using a
liquidated damages clause, holding higher inventories, or by maintaining control over Y's supply
WILLIAMSON,

of an important input.
15. Percentage-of-the-gross pricing, for example, can be used to adjust a contract to changing
circumstances, to discourage opportunitistic breach, see Hallagan, Share ContractingforCaif/ornia
Gold, 15 EXpLORaTIONS IN ECON. HIST. 196, 206-07 (1978), or to facilitate price discrimination,
see Caves & Murphy, Franchising:Firms, Markets,andIntangibleAssets, 42 S. ECON. J. 572, 57881 (1976).
16. See AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, PETROLEUM-INDUSTRY HEARINGS BEFORE THE
TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITTEE 105-06, 401-03 (1942); 1 S. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES 125 (1958). That thirty states have, since 1973, passed legislation barring the oil
companies from owning and operating gasoline stations must also be taken into account. The
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As a second example, Lenox's peculiar practice of terminating dealers
suspected of price-cutting without giving them warning (or even telling
them the reason for the termination)1 7 would be inexplicable unless one
recognizes that it was an attempt to meet the uncertain standard of legality established in United States v. Parke,Davis & Co.1 s Obviously,

since a structure depends on both economic and legal factors, explaining observed structures by the former alone is a risky proposition. I
stress this point here because it will be of critical importance in the

discussion in part V regarding protection of franchisees from termination or the threat thereof.19
I must emphasize that I counsel caution, not despair. The problem
is in many respects analogous to that of the biologist. Given some

hard-to-identify environmental constraints, why do certain physical or
behavioral characteristics enhance the likelihood of survival? The
large number of dissimilar, but successful, survival mechanisms is anal-

ogous to the variety of apparently successful structures for relationships. I do not want to push the analogy too far, yet it does suggest that
the relational perspective can impose at least a rough intellectual order

on observed outcomes. Our ability to explain will be much better on
the strategic level (the goals sought) than on the tactical (the particular
technique or tool used in pursuit of those goals). In the next part I will
describe the nature of a specific class of tactics-altering the costs of
exit-and suggest how that class relates to various strategic goals.20
II.

Barriers to Exit

Once the parties have entered into a long-term agreement, they
will continually weigh the merits of remaining in the relationship

against the benefits of exit. In discrete transactional analysis exit barriconstitutionality of this legislation has been upheld. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S.
117, 128 & n.18 (1978).
17. See In re Lenox, Inc., 73 F.T.C. 578, 585-88 (1968), mod//l'ed sub non Lenox, Inc. v.
F.T.C., 417 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1969), enforced as modfied, 77 F.T.C. 860 (1970). For a detailed
discussion of the Lenox marketing system and the FTC's investigation of it, see Goldberg, Resale
Price Maintenance, supra note 9.
18. 362 U.S. 29 (1960). Similarly, Richfield's policy of requiring that the dealer buy a minimum of 75% of its gasoline from Richfield was adopted "on the advice of its legal department"
following the lower court decision in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 78 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Cal.
1948). In practice, the dealers purchased all their gasoline from Richfield. See Brief for Appellant at 21, 25, Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States, 343 U.S. 922 (1952).
19. See text accompanying notes 128-33 infra.
20. Continuing the biological analogy, goals at the strategic level correspond to goals such as
the acquisition of adequate food, protection from predators, and reproduction, while adaptations
at the tactical level correspond to specific behavioral or physical characteristics. "Classes of tactics" roughly corresponds to notions such as territoriality-a commonly observed set of behavior
patterns that appears to affect survivability through a number of very different channels.
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ers are unfortunate frictional elements that impede the functioning of
natural market forces; ideally, they should be leveled. In the relational
framework, however, barriers can be functional and parties often will
find it in their mutual interest to alter the exit barriers for one or both
of them. The height of the barriers at each point in time is thus a crucial decision variable for the parties when structuring the relationship.
A wide range of techniques is available for influencing exit costs, and
in this part I will give an indication of their diverse nature. Although
the parties might want to raise or lower the barriers from their natural
level, the discussion will, for expositional ease, focus on the former.
A.

The Virtues of Exit Barriers

Before discussing the means, it will be useful to consider briefly
the ends. Why might exit barriers be functional? In general-but with
significant exceptions-if X's exit costs are raised, he does not benefit
directly from the increase. Rather, X gains because Y is willing to pay
Xfor accepting the higher exit barrier an amount that exceeds the costs
to X of enduring that barrier.
1. Enforceability.-Within the contract each party incurs costs
and receives benefits at various times, but the timing of the streams of
benefits and costs need not coincide. If at any point in the relationship
Y's anticipated benefits substantially exceed his anticipated costs, he is
vulnerable to being held up by X, particularly if, at that point, X expects low benefits and high costs by adhering to the contract terms. By
threatening breach, X conceivably can force Y to revise the contract
until Y's anticipated costs just equal his anticipated benefits, at which
point Y will be indifferent between completing the agreement on the
new terms or termination-that is, X can expropriate the quasi-rents.2 1
The parties are, of course, disciplined by both legal (contract) law and
extra-legal2 2 (good will) restraints. In many instances, however, they
will consider these restraints inadequate and will structure the arrange21. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 9, at 298.
22. For example, X may suffer damage to his reputation by breaching the agreement. The
premium he would have to pay in future dealings in this market is one of the penalties for exit.
The prospect of future dealings either with this particular trading partner or within this market
can be an extremely effective constraint on opportunistic behavior. Unreasonable breach or the
unreasonable insistence on literal adherence to the contract terms will impair a party's reputation.
This "good will" constraint will be less effective if. (a) the parties do not expect to deal with each
other or within a particular market again; (b) the complexity of the relationship makes it difficult
for an outsider to determine whether one party has acted unreasonably (thus, parties have an
incentive to put up a smokescreen of countercharges); (c) the dispute is over an unusual issue that
social norms only vaguely address; or (d) there are tremendous rewards for violating the social
norms.

Vertical Restrictions
ment to enhance its enforceability by making the streams of costs and
benefits for each party more nearly coincident (in this instance, lowering the costs of exit for Y and raising them for X).
2. Reliance.-If one party intends to make investments whose
value is contingent upon continuation of the agreement, then it will
want to protect its reliance by ensuring continuation. Franchisees invest in the franchisor's inventories, signs, and promotion. Franchisors
train their dealers and provide specialized knowledge on business techniques. Neither party would incur these costs without at least some
expectation that the relationship will continue long enough for him to
recoup his expenditures.2 3 Let us consider an example of a very different sort. Suppose a landowner is contemplating building a structure on
his property. If after the structure is completed the state can take the
property without compensation, he would be reluctant to make the initial improvement. Reliance on the continuity of the law is precisely
analogous to reliance on the continuity of a contractual relationship.
Without protection, certain investments will be unattractive. Thus, if
we treat the law as a contract between the state and the individual,
protection of the individual's reliance interest would entail making exit
by the state very difficult. This characterization highlights an interesting aspect of the treatment of exit barriers in much economic analysis.
There is a presumption in discrete transactional economic analysis that
property rights should be defined on a one-shot basis and then protected by the state; exit barriers should be extremely high. In private
contractual relationships, however, exit barriers are traditionally
viewed as unfortunate frictional elements that ideally should be eliminated. This juxtaposition illustrates the similar role played by exit barriers in the two contexts. The benefits associated with the constancy of
rights definitions carry over to the private protection of reliance. (Conversely, the costs associated with the overprotection of reliance in private agreements underscore the problems arising from overprotection
of vested rights.)
3. Governance.-The initial agreement will, in general, be neither
self-enforcing nor self-adjusting. Internal prices and simple adjustment
rules (like indexing) can, of course, be prominent features of the agreements. The parties can supplement-or supplant-these passive de23. Enforceability and reliance overlap. Thus, if Yproduces a custom-made machine for X,
as Ynears completion, he will want to confront Xwith exit barriers that ensure completion of the
agreement. Alternatively, we might say that Y is concerned with protecting his reliance interest in
his investment in in-process inventory.
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vices by more activist forms of governance, such as monitoring or

policing, 4 authority, or voice.2

At various times during the long-term relationship, X's short-run
incentives may not induce performance fully consistent with the parties' long-run interests. An agreement that Y may police compliance
by detecting and penalizing violations will enhance the value to Y of
entering into the relationship.2 6 An authority relationship, in which X
agrees that certain future decisions regarding X's behavior shall be

made by Y,is an attractive device for postponing decisions until better
information is available. Y should be able to impose costs on X, both
to facilitate policing and to exercise his authority. High exit barriers
for X enhance Y's ability to impose costs in two ways. First, if X could
simply walk away without cost, he could ignore any particular punishment (such as a suspension or fine); however, ifXis subject to substantial losses if he breaches, he would be vulnerable to Y's threatened
punishments-the deterrents become credible. Second, a high exit barrier can be a powerful deterrent in its own right. Y can use the threat
of termination or nonrenewal (and the resultant costs to X) to influence

X's behavior.28
Mechanisms relying less on authority and more on consultation,
29

discussion, or more generally, what Hirschman refers to as "voice"
may also be attractive. Parties may want to make exit costly because
the availability of a low-cost exit option undercuts voice mechanisms.
High exit barriers for both parties make certain methods of adjusting
relationships and resolving conflicts more feasible by forcing the parties to work out their difficulties.3 °

24. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REv. 777, 782-83 (1972).
25. See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT,VOICE, AND LOYALTY 30-54 (1970).
26. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 24; Jensen & Meckling, Theory ofthe Firr"ManagerialBehavior, 4gency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FINANCIAL ECON. 305, 308, 313, 323-25
(1976). The definition of the policing function should be broad enough to include motivating X
and educating him about the benefits of foregoing the short-term gains.
27. See Simon, A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationshop, 19 ECONOMETRICA 293
(1951). In the standard conception of a strong hierarchical authority relationship, the authority is
concentrated in one party: the boss (employer or franchisor). Of course, the decisionmaker need
not be a party; he could, for example, be an arbitrator. Nor need the same individual make every
decision.
28. The parties usually expect franchise relationships to continue beyond the date specified
in the contract. Nonrenewal is, therefore, equivalent to termination.
29. A. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 25, at 30-54. Hirschman defines voice as "any attempt at all
to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual
or collective petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority
with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and
protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion." Id at 30.
30. Id. at 36-37. The contracting parties can, of course, be collectivities. High exit barriers

100
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It is important to recognize that these goals can be conflicting. If
Y wants to maintain authority over X, he will want to keep his own
exit costs low, for fear that X will not take his termination threats seriously. J's low exit costs will discourage X from making investments in
reliance on the agreement and will also discourage the development of
voice mechanisms for resolving conflict.
B.

The Techniques

A variety of devices is available for altering exit barriers. Penalizing exit or, identically, rewarding continuation, increases exit barriers.
Leaving hostages or promising a pound of flesh are rather extreme
ways for one party to assure the other that he will not back out. Less
extreme methods include the use of collateral, 31 deferred rebates,3 2 performance bonds, and liquidated damages. 3 A buyer could also agree
to pay a premium for goods or services provided during the relationship. The sacrifice of that premium is a cost of breach for the seller; the
higher the premium, the greater his exit barrier. 4
One device used in franchising combines a nonrefundable
franchise fee with an attractive stream of earnings,3 5 enhancing the
benefits to the franchisee of continuing the relationship (but producing
the opposite effect on the franchisor). Franchisors sometimes provide
critical inputs at a nominal or zero price. For years oil companies have
leased pumps to their dealers at very low rentals. 36 The possible loss of
the subsidized price deters exit by the franchisee. A free service that
the franchisee would have to pay for if he were to terminate the agreemay exist only at the collective level, not at the individual level. Thus, it may be very difficult to
dissolve the relationship between the firm and its union or between the management and the
stockholders, yet very easy for an individual employee or stockholder to leave.
31. See Benjamin, The Use of Collateralto Enforce Debt Contracts, 16 ECON. INQUIRY 333

(1978).
32. Alfred Marshall noted that steamship companies at the end of the nineteenth century
adopted a policy of "withholding the rebate for a long time, in order to keep the shipper in what
he regards as bondage." A. MARSHALL, INDUSTRY AND TRADE 439 (1919).
33. See generally Macneil, Primer,supra note 7, at 666-701.
34. See generallyBecker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation ofEnforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-13 (1974); Gintis, The Nature ofLaborExchange andthe Theory of
CapitalistProduction,8 REv. RADICAL POLITICAL ECON. 36, 43 (1976); Klein, Crawford & Alchi-

an, supra note 9.
35. One survey found a positive correlation between franchisee income and the size of the

franchise fee, which is consistent with my analysis. U. OZANNE & S. HUNT, SENATE SELECT
COMM. ON SMALL Bus., 92D CONG., 1ST SEss., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FRANCHISING 123
(Comm. Print 1971).

36. See, eg., FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923); 1 S. WHITNEY, supra note 16, at
108-09; Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearings Before the Temporary NationalEconomic Con=, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 8495-96 (1940) (testimony of Sidney A. Swensrud).

101
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ment has the same effect.3 7
Covenants not to compete are commonly used.3 8 Franchisees can
agree that upon termination they will not, for a number of years, enter
a similar line of business within a certain distance from the initial location. On termination, the franchisee thus sacrifices any good will or
specialized knowledge of the geographic area and product market for
the duration of the covenant; moreover, he may suffer relocation expenses. These potential losses deter exit by the franchisee.
Sharing contracts represent a quite different method for discouraging exit. If the franchisee is paid a flat rate for providing retail services
and it turns out that the market is much more attractive than anticipated, the franchisor has an incentive to terminate the agreement.
However, if the pricing formula enables him to share the success of the
market, termination is less attractive. There are numerous variants on
this sharing concept. Royalties based on a percentage of the gross are
common, especially in fast food franchising. 9 Oil companies commonly lease service stations to dealers, basing the'rent on a fixed price
per gallon sold. Resale price maintenance fixes both the price to the
dealer and his selling price, thereby establishing a sharing rate. Arguably, any effect of these sharing arrangements on the attractiveness of
exit is ancillary to other effects, such as facilitating discrimination,
sharing risk, and altering incentives. Even if that is true as a general
proposition, Hallagan's recent study of share contracting for gold suggests that, in at least one instance, discouraging exit was of paramount
importance. 4°
Another way to influence the attractiveness of exit is to link the
relationship to others.4 Y's vulnerability to X's threat of termination
is reduced if Y can impose reciprocal costs on X in another relationship. Reciprocity is one technique for providing mutual incentives to
perform.4 2 In other words, a party's vulnerability to the threat of termination is increased when the threat is linked to complementary rela37. See United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 295 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Richfield
agreed with most of its independent dealers to paint the service station with its own colors and
insignia at no cost to the dealer. If, however, the dealer terminated the franchise, he became liable

for the cost of painting.
38. See U. OZANNE & S. HUNT,supra note 35, at 250. Of all sampled agreements, 52%
contained franchisee restrictions based on distance, and 60% contained restrictions based on time.
39. Id at 215. The survey found that 90% of the contracts in the sample included royalty fees
based on a percentage of the gross.
40. Hallagan, supra note 15, at 207-09.

41. Note that this is one way of characterizing the discipline of continuous dealings (or concern for one's reputation). Expected future dealings with this particular party or with others police performance of a particular obligation.
42. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 9, at 304-05.
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tionships. 43 GTE Sylvania's termination of Continental T.V.'s
franchises is an example. 44 Upon termination GTE Sylvania instructed
the fim that serviced its floor plan financing to demand payment from
Continental. When payment was not forthcoming, it instructed the
firm "to bring suit, repossess all Continental's Sylvania merchandise,
attach Continental's bank accounts and (although no lien was even asserted on anything other than a portion of Continental's Sylvania inventory) cause the United States Marshals to close and padlock
Continental's main store and its warehouse. ' 4 The linkage can also
take the form of collective action by individuals engaged in similar relationships-trade unions, tenant unions, franchisee organizations, and
so forth. The individual worker's ability to impose costs on an employer is apt to be small; but if all workers agree to act in concert the
firm will find that the cost of firing a worker has increased dramatically.
The range of devices available for altering exit barriers should
now be obvious.' While the devices can be viewed as substitutes, it
should be clear that they are not interchangeable parts. The appropriateness of a particular device depends critically on the context, often in
subtle ways. Fortunately, for my immediate purposes I need not investigate the choice of technique. It is by recognition of the legitimate uses
of these techniques that a relational exchange perspective has its impact
on antitrust analysis. The following part suggests that vertical restrictions can indeed be significant elements in an efficient marketing system.
III.

Franchising and Antitrust

The term "franchising" describes a diverse set of retailing arrangements. Business format franchising involves the licensing of a trademarked product, service, or method to a franchisee. Fast food outlets,
muffler repair shops, and convenience groceries are examples. Traditional franchising generally involves the provision of specialized retail43. See, eg., United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 287 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
44. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
45. Brief for Petitioners at 17, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977). Petitioners also claimed that Sylvania tried to influence another of Continental's major
suppliers to restrict credit. Id at 18. For a somewhat different version of the events, see Brief for
Respondents at 15-19.
46. I do not intend to provide an exhaustive list of possibilities. One further category does,
however, deserve acknowledgement: loyalty (the final third of Hirschman's triumvirate). See A.
HIRSCHMAN, supra note 25, at 76-105. An attachment to the relationship (patriotism, team spirit,
labor solidarity, corporate identity) enhances the perceived value of remaining within the relation-

ship.
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ing services-automobile dealerships and service stations are
examples.4 7 In the traditional franchises the dealer often specializes in
handling a small product line, carrying exclusively (or nearly so) the
franchisor's merchandise; the franchisee's business identity is thus intimately related to the continuation of the relationship. At the other extreme, the franchise agreement may pertain to a product constituting a
small element in the retailer's product line; the arrangement may be so
casual that it is indistinguishable from routine transactions between
strangers. For example, a manufacturer selling indiscriminately
through any retailers willing to carry its product may routinely send
these retailers a document labeled "franchise agreement" that states the
parties' intent to deal with each other sometime in the future, but fixes
only minor terms for these future transactions. 48
By imposing vertical restrictions on franchisees-resale price
maintenance, territorial restrictions, exclusive dealing, long-term contracts, tie-ins, and other devices-franchisors often have been found to
violate the antitrust laws.49 After briefly reviewing the state of the law
regarding vertical restrictions, I will suggest how recognition of relational concepts can establish the reasonableness of certain restrictions.
The State of the Law-An Overview5"

A.

Resale price maintenance agreements have been per se violations
of the antitrust law since Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons.5 1 Federal legislation5 2 exempted agreements authorized under
53
state fair trade laws, but Congress withdrew this exemption in 1975.
Franchisors could, under the Colgate refusal-to-deal doctrine, 54 enforce
47. See INDUSTRY & TRADE AD., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FRANCHISING IN THE ECONOMY, 1977-1979, at 1-3 (1979). Franchise agreements are not always made with retailers.

Franchise agreements with distributors (wholesalers) are common. Nevertheless, they are usually
closely linked to another set of agreements involving the retailers. One significant exception to
this is the soft drink bottler franchise between syrup manufacturers and bottlers.
48. Estimates generally place the share of retail sales through franchising at about one-third
(excluding the extremely casual pseudo-franchises noted in the text). Id at 11. About 35% of the
franchised units are service stations; less than 7% are automobile and truck dealerships, but they
account for about half of all franchise sales. Id. at 34.
49. Of course, not all the cases in these areas involve franchising. Long-term contracts frequently are used in commercial contexts quite apart from retailing. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); In re Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 82 F.T.C. 1529 (1973).
50. For a summary of the state of the law prior to GTE Sylvania, see L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST ch. 5 (1977); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, VERTICAL
RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION (Monograph No. 2, 1977).
51. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
52. McGuire Act, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) (repealed 1975).

53. Act of December 12, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1970)).
54. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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a price maintenance system by announcing a policy of retail sales at a
fixed price and refusing to deal with retailers who failed to maintain
that price. Recent decisions, however, have limited the availability of
Colgate. Virtually any active enforcement of the policy-including
such simple actions as responding to a dealer's complaint that another
dealer is not maintaining prices-undermines the Colgate defense."
The courts have dealt with other restrictions less severely. While
some restrictions, notably those binding service stations, were violations prior to 1967, the pre-Schwinn law generally was not hostile to
nonprice vertical restrictions so long as the restrictions were not camouflage for horizontal market division. 6 The Schwinn Court went even
further than the government had asked, ruling that when a manufacturer sold its product it relinquished its ability to dictate the terms of a
subsequent resale.5 7 The manufacturer could, however, retain control
through vertical integration or some lesser form of integration such as
agency. The decision engendered substantial criticism. Milton Handler's characterization was typical:
Schwinn [was] a mischievous precedent which rested on a nonexistent principle of ancient property law, and was historically incorrect, indefensible as a matter of logic, and unjustifiable as a
matter of economics. That case was unique in the annals of antitrust for the volume of futile and costly litigation it generated and
for the degree of confusion with which it enveloped a branch of
law which had theretofore been relatively free of uncertainty.
The lower courts had thus been compelled to indulge in tenuous
distinctions to avoid its harsh requirements and to apply its doctrine, when it could not be rationally distinguished, with reluctance and distaste. 8
The restrictions condemned in Schwinn concerned the customers
to whom wholesalers could resell: they could sell only in designated
territories and only to Schwinn's franchised retailers. The lower court
condemned the former restraint only;5 9 the Supreme Court condemned
the latter as well. In GTE Sylvania6" dealers were franchised to sell
55. See, ag., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 50, § 139, at 392-95; Pitofsky & Dam, Is the Colgate
DoctrineDead?, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 772 (1968).
56. See, e.g, White Motors v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). Professor Sullivan, however, notes that in the 1950s and 1960s the government brought a number of suits based on vertical
nonprice restrictions that ended in consent decrees granting the requested relief. L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 50, § 143, at 402.

57. 388 U.S. at 378.
58. Handier, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrine: An Unprecedented Supreme Court
Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 979, 980-81 (1977).

59. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 342 (1965), rev'd and remanded, 388 U.S. 365 (1967).

60. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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only from particular locations. When Continental T.V. begain selling
from a Sacramento outlet at which it did not have a franchise, GTE
Sylvania terminated the franchise at Continental's other locations.
Continental sued, contending, among other things, that the location
clause was a per se violation of the antitrust law. The trial court
agreed, 6 1 but the court of appeals reversed, 62 attempting to distinguish
the case from Schwinn by arguing that the Schwinn restraints applied to
the customer, while the GTE Sylvania ones did not.63 A customer was
free to buy from Continental regardless of where that customer lived;
however, he could buy from Continental only at those locations at
which Continental was franchised to sell. Rather than apply this distinction, the Supreme Court chose to overrule Schwinn.64 Nonprice
no longer illegal per se; they are now subject to
vertical restrictions are
65
a rule of reason test.
B. Marketing Efficiency
The Supreme Court in GTE Sylvania stressed that vertical restrictions have "redeeming virtues": by fostering increased distributional
6

efficiency, the restrictions actually promote interbrand competition.

One can best appreciate this position-an approach that hinges on the
recognition of relational concepts-by considering the alternative offered by the franchisee in GTE Sylvania: "The vice in what Schwinn
and Sylvania did is. . .in the fact that the manufacturer's hand, rather
61. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc),
aft'd,433 U.S. 36 (1977).
62. Id
63. Id at 988-90. The court also noted that on remand in Schwinn the district court allowed
Schwinn to use location clauses in its retail franchise agreements. In addition, the Ninth Circuit
cited several lower court decisions, including location clause cases, that had upheld particular
practices not covered by the Schwinn rule.
64. Justice White, in his concurring opinion, preferred to avoid overruling Schwinn and instead adopted the Ninth Circuit's position, distinguishing Schwinn. 433 U.S. at 59 (White, J., con-

curring).
65. The majority, however, left untouched the rule of per se illegality for resale price maintenance. Id at 51 n.18.
66. Id at 54-57. The Court acknowledged the substantial scholarly support for the economic
utility of vertical restrictions, citing Bork, The Rule ofReason andthe PerSe Concept: PriceFixing
andMarket Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966); Posner, AntitrustPolicy and the Supreme
Court: 4n ,4nalysis fthe RestrictedDistribution,HorizontalMergerandPotentialCompetition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. Rsv. 282, 283, 287-88 (1975); and Preston, Restrictive DistributionArrangements. EconomicAnalysis andPublicPolicy Standards,30 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 506, 511 (1965).
The Court also noted that it had refused to impose a per se rule against vertical restrictions in
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). The Court based this refusal in large
part on its uncertainty whether vertical restrictions satisfied the standard expressed in Northern
Pacific for imposing a per se rule. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)
("pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue"). It should be clear that the
tie-ins at issue in Northern Pacfic also fail to satisfy the per se standard formulated therein.
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than the unseen hand of the market, is at the competition throttle." 67
The franchisee further asserted:
The majority's view assumes that the manufacturer knows
better than the market how dealers ought to be deployed and
what services and facilities they should offer in order to maximize output. But this argument, like the comparable one in favor
of resale price maintenance, assumes that the manufacturer will
always know what is best and that his administered judgment
about the ideal deployment of outlets across the nation will be
more efficient than the deployment achieved through the myriad
individual decisions by dealers who have invested in the distribution process. This assumption undercuts the primary policy commitment of the antitrust laws, and the conviction that individual
market decisions are likely to be more sensitive, flexible and accurate gauges of the way resources6 should be deployed than any
monolithic, administered decision. 1
This argument applies with equal force (or lack thereof) to all "administered decisions," including those within firms. Society routinely
isolates a tremendous number of transactions from the free play of impersonal market forces for a very persuasive reason--cost. 69 Intrafirm
allocation (one significant manifestation of relational exchange) can be
much cheaper than market-mediated exchange. If this were not true
the survival of the firm that faces competition from the "market mechanism" would be difficult to explain.
The basic efficiency argument for vertical restrictions is straightforward. Manufacturers have a wide range of possible marketing strategies. They can engage in extensive national advertising, sell their
products to all retailers, and de-emphasize point-of-sale selling effort.
Or they can emphasize point-of-sale effort by door-to-door solicitation,
in-store display and demonstration, or local advertising. Franchising is
an attempt to induce point-of-sale effort and to influence the form that
effort will take. Selling effort is not a service easily bought and sold in
impersonal markets. The identity of the retailer is often important;
substantial relation-specific investment is frequently required. Moreover, the quality of the service is difficult to monitor, and retailers have
67. Brief for Petitioners at 32, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36

(1977).
68. Id at 58. Lawrence Sullivan was primarily responsible for the brief. He presents similar

arguments in his hornbook. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 50, § 145, at 411-14. Ironically, the brief
labels manufacturer control "paternalistic overreaching," while implicitly suggesting that the legal
prohibition of vertical restrictions is not paternalistic. Brief for Petitioners at 58-60.

69. See Coase, supra note 11, at 390-93. Coase does note, however, that a firm may reach a
size at which the costs of intrafi'm transactions exceed the costs of market transactions. .d at 39497.
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incentives to free ride on the efforts of others.70 The structure of the
franchise relationship reflects the franchisor's 71 efforts to cope with
these difficulties.
The dealer must be able to capture some of the rewards of his
selling efforts. With no shielding, each dealer has an incentive to free
ride on the efforts of others, and virtually no incentive to provide the
service. Dealers would, therefore, refrain from providing the selling
services. 7 2 By partially shielding each dealer from competition from
other dealers, the manufacturer can lessen the propensity to free ride.73
Moreover, since the methods available to the manufacturer for shielding a dealer differ in the nature and extent of protection provided to
particular dealer activities, the manufacturer can influence the mix of
pre- and post-sale dealer services. If a manufacturer engages in resale
price maintenance and sells to all retailers regardless of location, the
retailers are likely to engage in those forms of nonprice competition
that reward only the individual retailer, such as promoting the product
within the store and granting the product relatively more attractive
shelf space. Each retailer has little incentive to advertise since many
other retailers with whom he competes would share the benefit. If,
however, resale price maintenance were coupled with limited distribution-so that the dealer could expect little intrabrand competitionlocal advertising would be relatively more attractive. 74 Even in this sit70. Product reputation is a communal asset. If the costs of degrading quality fall primarily
on the brand name, rather than on the individual dealer, dealers would find that failure to maintain the brand name would not impair their short-run interests.
71. The franchisor typically designs the franchise agreement and offers it on a take-it-orleave-it basis to franchisees. This does not mean that franchisee interests are not considered, but
that the franchisee plays a passive role in the structuring process.
72. A memo from Magnavox (which used resale price maintenance and restricted distribution) to retailers who carried both its product and competing lines (the competing manufacturers
did not have restricted distribution policies) illustrates this point:
1. You are establishing a price from which the discounter starts cutting.
2. You loan your store's prestige to these discounted lines.
3. Your displays and showrooms and your sales people are giving free sales presentations to the discounters.
4. You are discouraging your own sales people who are losing their time and sale presentation to the discounter.
5. You are tying up capital and slowing down turnover that is needed in your
Magnavox line in better displays (which is quite mediocre in most cases), an adequate back-up stock which in most cases, is far too weak.
6. Your advertising dollars spent irrespective of distributor participation are being capitalized on by the multitude of other business houses with the same lines even disre.garding the discount houses.
Quotedin Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 9, at 57.
73. The Supreme Court specifically recognized the free rider problem in its GTE Sylvania
decision. 433 U.S. at 55. For a general development of the free rider argument, see R. POSNER,
supra note 1, at 148-50.
74. The manufacturer could prescribe cooperative advertising in lieu of territorial protection
or in conjunction with partial protection. Under a system of cooperative advertising the manufac-
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uation there can be major differences in retailing strategies. For example, both Magnavox television and audio systems and Lenox fine china
used resale price maintenance and limited distribution. Magnavox employed discounts and other enticements to encourage dealers to stock
only its brand; Lenox, however, preferred to market through dealers
carrying a large number of competing brands.75 The two strategies reflect differing evaluations of the costs of diluted representation of the
brand and the
benefits of spreading common marketing costs over a
76
base.
wider
Protection from intrabrand competition requires an enforcement
apparatus. The enforcement problem is similar to that facing any cartel: cheating must be detected and penalized. The greater the rewards
for antigroup behavior, ceteris paribus (for example, the higher the
margin in a resale price maintenance system), the more difficult it will
be to maintain the structure. While the problems of running a cartel
and a franchising system are analytically equivalent in this context, the
policy implications are different. In the franchising context, the cartellike activities are an integral element of the retailing system. There is
no reason to presume, as courts habitually do,7 7 that the restrictions in
the franchising context have any of the anticompetitive characteristics
associated with interbrand cartels: precisely the same enforcement apparatus would be appropriate if the retailers were all employees of the
manufacturer.
Businessmen have developed numerous techniques for detecting
and penalizing violations of the terms of the agreement. Judicial hostility-primarily toward resale price maintenance-has provided a
strong impetus for creative enforcement efforts.78 To facilitate detection of price-cutting, manufacturers can limit the dealers' ability to tie
turer agrees to pay a share of the dealer's local advertising expenses (generally for newspapers).
Magnavox, for example, paid at least 50% for all its dealers, even if no local intrabrand competition existed. It paid 67% for some dealers (generally those in urban areas in which there was more
than one Magnavox dealer). Other television manufacturers employed less selective distribution
techniques and typically had higher cooperative sharing rates; the prevailing industry rate was
75%. See Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 9, at 60-62.
75. See In re Magnavox Co., 78 F.T.C. 1183 (1971); In re Lenox, Inc., 73 F.T.C. 578 (1968),
modfedsub nom. Lenox, Inc. v. FTC, 417 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1969), enforcedas modfied, 77 F.T.C.

860 (1970).
76. See Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 9, at 24-25. Magnavox was one of
the few television manufacturers to engage in restricted distribution; part of its strategy was to aim
for submarkets in which intensive retail selling efforts would be more productive. Id. at 50. In
contrast, all of Lenox's fime china competitors employed restricted distribution. Id. at 24.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See
also R. POSNER, supra note I, at 164-65.

78. The following discussion will not distinguish between legal and illegal behavior.
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the sale of the product to something else, such as trading stamps, tradeins, or complementary goods or services. They can inspect invoices,
make cooperative advertising payments only for ads that include the
manufacturer's desired price, hire detectives to "shop" dealers, 79 and
encourage dealers to report violations by other dealers. If he detects a
violation the manufacturer can require the offending dealer to compensate the dealer who lost the sale or who reported the violation."0
The ultimate sanction, of course, is termination. The greater the
costs of termination to the dealer, the more susceptible he is to the
franchisor's threat; the lower the costs of termination to the manufacturer, the more credible that threat. Dealers as a group generally approve an arrangement in which the franchisor can impose substantial
termination costs on cheaters.8" However, the difficulties in designing

the termination sanction so that it will be employed only against cheat-

ers make high termination costs less attractive for franchisees.8 2 Conflict over the conditions of termination has been a significant problem
in franchising and has left its imprint on the antitrust treatment of vertical restrictions.8 3
The foregoing analysis indicates the ways in which franchisors can
combine vertical restrictions with enforcement to elicit various forms of
intensive retailing effort from their dealers. The nature of the desired
effort, the ability of the franchisor to induce that effort, and the tech-

niques for structuring the relationship need not be the same for all industries, within industries, or even for two dealers carrying the same
product of a single manufacturer.8 4 This diversity does not imply
79. As late as the 1960s there existed specialized firms--shopping services-that shopped
retailers to "determine the courtesy and efficiency of the employees and whether the price structure is being maintained." Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 9, at 73.
80. For example, Dictograph, a hearing aid manufacturer that granted exclusive territories
and engaged in resale price maintenance, included in its franchise contract a specific compensa-

tion rate for infringing another distributor's territory-30% of the suggested retail price. Another
hearing aid manufacturer, Maico, included a clause authorizing the manufacturer to settle disputes regarding infringement and to determine the amount of compensation to be paid.
Magnavox had a general understanding with its dealers that if a dealer could procure an invoice
from a customer showing that the customer had purchased the Magnavox product at a discount,
Magnavox would pay the reporting dealer the amount of the discount and charge the discounter
twice that amount. See Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 9, at 75-76.
81. Thus, a 1961 Magnavox advertisement to the trade stated that price cutting did not occur
"because that firm uncompromising unrelenting firehorse, Frank Freimann [its president] will not
let it develop, stamps it and you out the first time you try any fancy footwork." Quoted in
Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 9, at 74.
82. Ozanne and Hunt report that of their sample of fast food franchisees, 75% felt that federal legislation restricting a franchisor's ability to terminate the agreement was necessary. U.
OZANNE & S. HuNT, supra note 35, at 277.
83. See text accompanying notes 110-27 infra.
84. Retailing strategies in large urban centers, which support both large discounters and
small specialty stores, are likely to be substantially different from those used in small, isolated
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chaos. Ordered patterns can and do emerge, and some elements of
them can be quite stable for lengthy periods. It is, however, equally
important to recognize that many elements of the marketing program
are in flux. The manufacturer is at best a groping optimizer, developing and modifying marketing strategies in response to feedback and a
changing understanding of the efficacy of alternative approaches. The
parties, and most emphatically, outsiders, do not know what is best;
seemingly innocuous changes can have dramatic effects on the program's success.
I stress this last point for two reasons. First, courts and commentators frequently embrace a "less restrictive" test for vertical restrictions.
If the same goal can be achieved by less restrictive means, then the
more restrictive practice violates the law. Since primary-area-of-responsibility clauses and profit pass-overs are "less restrictive" in this
scheme, they should not be illegal per se,85 whereas so-called airtight
territorial restrictions should be illegal.8 6 But the franchisor who
adopts more restrictive terms probably does so because he believes
those terms are more efficacious. The high cost of violating an airtight
clause may provide a better balance of conflicting interests than would
the lower costs associated with the contractual alternatives. Indeed, the
concept of an airtight clause is itself peculiar. The franchisor cannot
prevent violation; it can only discourage it by adjusting the penalty and
reward structure. Clever drafting can make the actual penalties associated with less restrictive terms equal to or even greater than those associated with more restrictive terms.
Second, the groping optimization metaphor emphasizes the role of
the competitive process in producing competitive results. The search
for efficient marketing tools is similar to the search for efficient production techniques.8" The strong presumption against imposing external
legal restrictions on the choice of production techniques should carry
over to the marketing context, in which the outsider's knowledge of the
effect of legal rules on outcomes is, if anything, even more deficient.
towns. For example, although Magnavox used resale price maintenance (with the same prices and
dealer discount schedules) in both milieux, it varied other elements of its retailing strategy. See
Goldberg, Resale Price Maintenance, supra note 9, at 59-69.
85. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271-72 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-

ring).
86. Justice Brennan at least suggested this result in White Motor. Id. at 271. He noted in his
concurrence that these restrictions-which impose a risk upon the dealer of losing his franchise if
he sells across exclusive territorial boundaries-pose "serious hazards which might well deter any
effort to compete." Id. See generally Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: AntitrustAnalysis ofNon-Price
Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978).
87. The technique in the former is to combine contractual terms rather than physical factors
of production.
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C. Qualfi/cations
The argument that vertical restrictions are significant elements in
efficient marketing systems and that decentralized search will make efficient outcomes more likely is compelling. The argument does not,
however, translate into an unambiguous policy recommendation. The
contractual outcomes are efficient in a special sense. The agreement is
the best the parties can do for themselves, given the constraints.8 8
Whether it is also best for society is a different question; there are a
number of reasons for the possible divergence of private and social efficiency. I will discuss these briefly under four headings: (1) cartelization; (2) entry barriers; (3) product differentiation; and (4) dynamics.
Whether one can design policies to cope successfully with these
matters is still another question. My suspicion is that for the third and
fourth categories, at least, the answer would generally be negative.
These issues, however, are worth raising, for even if they are not now
policy-relevant, they help put any policy recommendation in perspective. A very liberal policy toward vertical restrictions is not "clearly
best"; rather it is "probably least worst."
- Cartelization.-Eithermanufacturers or dealers can use vertical restrictions to facilitate cartel behavior. Manufacturers use vertical
restrictions to mitigate the destabilizing effects of unrestricted dealer
competition on the wholesale price structure. Professor Posner describes the dealer cartel:
[T]he manufacturer may be the cat's paw of cartelizing dealers:
the dealers want to fix prices and somehow coerce, or otherwise
enlist, the manufacturer (perhaps they pay him) to act as their
agent in administering a cartel, which he does either by fixing a
uniform retail price for his goods or by assigning nonoverlapping
sales territories to the dealers. It is not enough, however, for the
dealers to enlist only a single manufacturer in their scheme.
They must also enlist all (or at least most) of his competitors.
Otherwise the only effect of the cartel may be to induce consumers to substitute other manufacturers' brands of the product in
question.8 9
The dealers' ability to impose a cartel upon reluctant manufacturers has deteriorated noticeably in the last generation. Thus, while ob88. The "efficient marketing" argument presupposes that the industry's equilibrium marketing configuration will be optimal. If, however, multiple equilibria exist, the industry might have
settled at a locally optimal, but globally suboptimal, marketing system. An exogenous shock-for
example, an antitrust prosecution-might serve to shake up current, comfortable arrangements

and facilitate the movement to a preferred state.
89. R. POSNER, supra note I, at 148.

112

Vertical Restrictions

jections to vertical restrictions-especially resale price maintenanceon this ground may have been compelling in the 1930s, or even in the
1950s, they are much less so today. Retail druggists had been the primary supporters of resale price maintenance since the turn of the century and were the moving force behind the passage of fair trade
legislation in the 1930s.90 By threatening to boycott noncomplying
manufacturers, 91 or by including nonsigner clauses in fair trade legislation,92 druggists and other retailers were able to confront the manufacturer with an all-or-nothing choice: it could either sell through retailers
using resale price maintenance or it could sell through other retailers.93
Faced with this choice, manufacturers in a number of industries in the
1930s found the fair trade alternative more attractive. However, the
rise of discount stores and the increased role of television advertising in
providing marketing services dramatically altered the situation. Now,
facing the same all-or-nothing choice on a statewide basis, most manufacturers would find their large discount store customers too valuable
to lose and would be more likely to opt for free trade instead of fair
trade. Price maintenance for geographic submarkets within states,
however, could be feasible if the colluding dealers could induce manufacturers to keep the product out of the hands of local price cutters by
restricting transshipment by arbitragers. 94
2. Entry Barriers.-Williamsonsuggests that vertical integration
by contract can have an additional influence on each market. 9 Poten90. See generally J. PALAMOUNTAIN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 90-106, 235-53 (1955).
For a discussion of resale price maintenance in nondrug industries circa 1900, see R. HOWER,
HISTORY OF MACY'S OF NEW YORK 1858-1919, at 349-60 (1943).
91. In 1906 the National Association of Retail Druggists (NARD) organized a Tripartite
Agreement among manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers establishing "uniform retail prices
through manufacturers' sales contracts binding distributors to specified resale prices. Manufacturers were induced to sign contracts by a well organized program of blacklists, white lists, and
boycotts by wholesalers and retailers." J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 90, at 94. While this agreement was subsequently held to violate the Sherman Act, Jayne v. Loder, 149 F. 21 (3d Cir. 1906),
the boycott weapon was still used effectively on occasion. For example, after Pepsodent withdrew
from its California fair trade contracts in 1935, virtually all California druggists refused to sell
Pepsodent; following a few months of drastically lower sales, Pepsodent not only agreed to sign
fair trade contracts, but also contributed $25,000 to NARD in support of the campaign for fair
trade acts. J. PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 90, at 239.
92. Nonsigner clauses require that if one retailer in a state signs a fair trade contract with a
manufacturer, then all retailers in that state are bound by it even though they have not signed.
93. The manufacturer could make the choice somewhat less extreme by marketing one brand
through the fair trade channel and another brand of a similar product through the other marketing channel.
94. Ironically, today a nonsigner clause might make resale price maintenance less likely (assuming it were legal). Dealers would not be able to isolate the geographic submarkets in which
fair trade would be feasible, nor would they have sufficient strength to force statewide adoption.
95. Williamson, Market Restrictions, supra note 9, at 955-56.
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tial entrants in manufacturing want to be assured of the availability of
dealers (and vice versa). If most dealers have exclusive dealing contracts 96 with existing manufacturers, the potential newcomer might find
it necessary to enter at both levels simultaneously. Even if feasible,
entry at two levels by a single firm may be more costly than independent entry at each level, for two reasons. First, the higher capital requirement of the potential entrant raises the cost of capital. Second, a
firm with an endowment favorable to entry at one level may have to
invest substantially to develop the capability for entry at the other
level. These specialized investments in factors such as managerial
teams will be more costly to it than to firms that already are capable of
entry at the second level: "Nonconvergent expectations" may impede
entry at a single level-that is, the entrant's decisions at one level may
be incompatible with the interdependent decisions made at the other
level. Thus, vertical integration, whether formal or contractual, may
exacerbate entry barriers at both levels and thereby further restrict
competition. To present a serious policy problem, however, Williamson emphasizes that concentration in one stage must be high (or effective collective refusal to deal must exist).
3. Product Differentiation.-Assume that cartelization is not a
motive and that franchisors adopt vertical restrictions only to make
their marketing activities more efficient. Unlike production economies,
these marketing economies may nevertheless have some undesirable
consequences. For example, the intensive retailing effort elicited by exclusive dealing may misrepresent the brand's quality. Further, if a
high, nondiscounted price influences the perceived quality of a product, achieving a positive consumer response via resale price maintenance is not an obviously desirable achievement. 97 The maxim de
gustibus non est dispulandum need not serve as an insurmountable barrier to consideration of these, and similar, questions.
Comanor9 8 has argued that product differentiation in general and
96. Williamson's emphasis on exclusive dealing contracts is probably misplaced. The key
issue concerns the barriers to exit for dealers, regardless of the form of agreement.
97. High price can be an element of quality or an indicator of it. High price can enhance the
snob appeal of the product. See Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory
of Consumers'Demand,64 Q.J. EcON. 183 (1950). Alternatively, in a world of inadequate information in which the various methods for developing information are costly, high price might be
taken as one of many imperfect signals of product quality. The incentive for low quality producers to free ride on the signal complicates analysis of price as a quality indicator. For evidence that
consumers do take price as an indicator of quality, see Cornell, Priceas a Quality Signal- Some
Additional Experimental Results, 16 ECON. INQUIRY 302 (1978).
98. Comanor, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions. White Motors and Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1968).
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vertical restrictions in particular result in higher entry barriers and
greater allocative inefficiency. While I think the evidence on this point
is ambiguous at best, it at least calls into question the net efficiency
effects of marketing economies that enhance product differentiation.9 9
The recent theoretical literature on imperfect competition in a
world of imperfect information suggests that many of the welfare propositions derived from the model of perfect competition do not survive
in a more complex environment. In particular, if marketing or customer search costs are positive, free entry will yield inefficient equilibria even for small deviations from the perfect competition model. 1°0
Whether or not one takes specific conclusions in the literature seriously, and in general I am skeptical, the overall message is still humbling. The presumption that the internally efficient marketing strategy
will, with workable competition (easy entry), yield desirable outcomes
on the industry level is a bit less secure.
But it is nonetheless difficult for courts to rely heavily on these
conclusions in formulating policy toward vertical restrictions. There is
little reason to believe that banning some subsets of marketing techniques, including particular vertical restrictions, would yield improvements in any dimension. These considerations demonstrate the need
for a more cautious rhetoric in support of liberalized antitrust treatment of vertical restrictions. To go much beyond that, however, would
seem irresponsible.
4. Dynamics.-Williamson's proposed policy for vertical restrictions provides a useful vehicle for illustrating another set of difficulties:
1. Absent a tightly oligopolistic industry, vertical restrictions of
all kinds are lawful and can be presumed to promote transaction cost economies.
2. Uniform reliance on vertical restrictions of any kind--on
price, territories, customers, or exclusive dealing-in tightly
oligopolistic circumstances
a. can be challenged on the grounds that these promote
more effective interdependence; but
b. such challenges can be met by showing that nontrivial
losses of transaction cost economies would result.10 1
99. See generally WORCESTER, WELFARE GAINS FROM ADVERTISING: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATION (1978); Brozen, Entry Barriers: Advertising and Product Dfferentiation, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 115 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds.
1974); Mann, Advertising, Concentration,and Proftabilityw The State of Knowledge and Directions
for PublicPolicy, in id. at 137.
100. For a summary of some of the recent work, see J. Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information (manuscript 1978) (copy on file at the Texas Law Review).
101. Williamson, Market Restrictions, supra note 9, at 993.
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Suppose then that a particular industry can be characterized as
tightly oligopolistic. 1 2 Under Williamson's policy, if a practice is
adopted by one or a few firms, then it, is lawful; if, however, it is
10 3
adopted by all or most firms, then it is subject to a rule of reason.
Should the rule of reason test take into account the costs of undoing the restrictions? If the remedy entails revision of the marketing
system and that revision results in the destruction of relation-specific
(primarily intangible) capital, how should those costs be reckoned? If
we do include those costs, then the likelihood of a successful challenge
will be low; indeed, the oligopolists will have an incentive to arrange
their affairs to make dismantling an expensive proposition. °4 If the
costs are not taken into account, then the firms are less likely to explore
the merits of marketing innovations requiring substantial relation-specific investment. This problem parallels the "unscrambling eggs" issue
in merger law; 05 arguably, an incipiency rule would reasonably balance the costs.
Suppose that only a few firms have adopted a particular restriction, and therefore the practice is deemed lawful. If the remainder then
adopt that same practice, should every firm be subject to antitrust investigation, or only the latecomers? An exemption for the initial adopters encourages manufacturers to launch "preemptive strikes." The
manufacturer will preserve his options by including all possible vertical
restrictions in the franchise agreement (whether or not he enforces
them). If, on the other hand, every firm is subject to prosecution, early
adopters are vulnerable to the strategic threats of others. The
nonadopters can threaten adoption, imposing a high cost on the early
adopters-the possibility that they will have to dismantle their entire
102. This supposition raises some market definition difficulties that I shall set aside.
103. The second element of Williamson's proposal---that if a practice is widely adopted by the
industry, its legality is determined by the rule of reason-also raises some interesting questions.
See Williamson, Market Restrictions, supra note 9, at 975-85. Demonstrating the existence of
nontrivial economies is, of course, difficult, especially when we ask, "Compared to what?" It is
probably not difficult to show that some vertical integration by contract will be more efficient than
reliance on impersonal markets. But how does one show that a territorial restriction is more
efficient than, for example, a location clause? Williamson's rule of reason is likely to degenerate
into the test frequently applied by courts: are there "less restrictive" devices for achieving the
parties' legitimate goals?
104. In discussing predatory pricing by a dominant firm owning a fixed stock of a durable
machine, Williamson argues against rules that entail "involuntary asset retirement" and thereby
"waste goods having social value." Williamson, PredatoryPricing: A Strategicand We/fareAnaysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 318-20 (1977). The destruction of intangible capital caused by dismantling
a marketing arrangement is, in essence, an involuntary asset retirement. Williamson's recognition
of these costs in the predatory pricing context does not carry over to his vertical restrictions analysis.
105. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, supra note 50, § 216.
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marketing system. The early adopter's asymmetric vulnerability will
10 6
discourage early adoption, thereby impeding the innovation process.
There is widespread agreement that vertical restrictions used to
maintain a horizontal cartel should be illegal.10 7 Assuming that the
horizontal cartel is not a concern 0 8 (and leaving aside the relational
governance issues addressed in the next two parts), a good argument
can be made, along the lines suggested by Williamson, 10 9 for a tolerant
policy toward vertical restrictions. The argument, however, is not as
clean and neat as the efficient marketing explanation would suggest.
IV.

Governing Relational Power and the Termination Sanction
The franchisor's power over its franchisees has been an object of

judicial concern. Franchisors can use their power to impose costs as a
sanction to enforce vertical restrictions. If a restriction is not a blatant
violation of the law, courts have considered the franchisor's potential
relational power or his actual use of that power in determining whether
the arrangement goes beyond legal boundaries. 1 0° The courts, however, have also been concerned with the issue of power in another context. They have attempted to alter--or, more accurately, to governthe relationship in an effort to redress certain perceived inequities. Judicial attempts to extend protection to dealers in an effort to correct an
imbalance of power in the relationship provide examples of this sort of
relational governance. In a number of instances, courts sympathetic to
a perceived dealer plight have used the existence of a particular restriction as a pretext for extending protection. It is not so much the pursuit
106. Conceivably, the outsiders can even use the asymmetry to enforce cartelization; they can
make clear to the early adopters that failure to conform to the cartel policy will result in punishment-imitation followed by antitrust prosecution.
107. Various forms of horizontal price fixing or market division are arguably functional; the
per se rule is so well established in this context, however, that it must be accepted as an exogenous
constraint on policymakers.
108. Vertical restrictions should also be suspect when used to siphon profits from nonprofit
organizations to profitmaking firms. Contracts between car rental firms and public airports may
have this characteristic. See Dollar Rent A Car Systems, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 434 F. Supp. 513
(N.D. Cal. 1977). The problem is analogous to that of AT&T's ownership of Western Electric.
Whether these problems should be dealt with by antitrust enforcement agencies or by other government bodies such as the CAB or FAA, I am not prepared to say. See Verkuil, State Action, Due
Process andAntitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 328 (1975).
109. See notes 101-03 supra & accompanying text. Williamson's position is virtually indistinguishable from that of Bork or Posner. See Bork, supra note 5; Posner, The Rule ofReason andthe
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHt. L. REv. 1 (1977).
110. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S.
357 (1965); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts
of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC,
360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
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of this dealer protection goal that has contributed to the confused state
of the case law, but rather the unarticulatedpursuit of it.
The courts have at times failed to distinguish between asymmetric
power within the relation and asymmetric power at the formation
stage. Justice Black's Perma Lfett ' decision is the leading example.
Arguing that the illegal contract terms had been thrust upon the franchisees by a powerful franchisor, he stated:
[The franchisees'] participation was not voluntary in any meaningful sense. They sought the franchise enthusiastically but they
did not actively seek each and every clause of the agreement.
Rather, many of the clauses were quite clearly detrimental to
their interests, and they alleged that they had continually objected to them. Petitioners apparently accepted many of these renecessary to obtain
straints solely because their acquiescence was 112
an otherwise attractive business opportunity.
That is like saying if X agrees to pay one dollar for a widget, the "restraint" that he pay one dollar is detrimental to his interest. One cannot simply choose some terms from a complex agreement and say that
since those terms hurt one party, they were not agreed to.
Most potential franchisees have substantial choice at the formation
stage. They have little or no capital-physical, human, or intangible
(good will)-whose value depends upon entering into a contract with a
particular franchisor. 1'3 Judge Aldisert put the issue into proper perspective in Dunkin' Donuts:114
We do not imagine that many persons are, in any meaningful
sense, forced to enter into franchise agreements. It may be that
111. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). Perma
Life began as a treble damages suit by a group of terminated dealers against the franchisor, Midas
Mufflers. Since the franchisees had themselves signed the contracts that were alleged to be violations of the antitrust law, the lower court granted a summary judgment for defendant. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the suit was not barred by the doctrine of in
pari deli/do. In allowing plaintiffs' claim for relief, the Court stated that many of the contract
terms were accepted involuntarily. Id. at 139. The parties then settled out of court for a fairly
modest amount. Midas did not revise its franchise agreements until two years after the decision,
and industry sources suggest that the revision was not in direct response to this decision; those
sources also suggest that the decision did not precipitate other suits by disgruntled Midas dealers.
112. Id.
113. A franchisee with specialized skills (perhaps, for example, a hearing aid dealer) may find
his formation-stage choices sharply circumscribed. But that would be the exception. The district
court in Dunkin' Donuts noted that plaintiffs (terminated dealers seeking class certification) included a former butcher, barber, teacher, automotive designer, and railroad conductor. The court
recognized that some of the franchisees were multi-unit operators, but stated: "[W]e suspect preliminarily (and tentatively) that none of the franchisees has as yet reached a position of bargaining
equality with Dunkin' Donuts." Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D.
Pa. 1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). For a discussion of
franchisee origins, see U. OzANNE & S. HuNT, supra note 35, at 110-12.
114. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.), cert.denied,429 U.S.
823 (1976).
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some do so because they have been deceived as to the terms, or
the potential profitability, of the franchise; it may be that others
do so because they lack sophistication and do not understand or
appreciate the details of the bargain. More realistically, we
would expect to find that an arrangement apparently reasonable
at its inception begins to seem burdensome to the franchisee as
the business is successfully established. Only from the successful
business can the franchisor effectively seek a continuing return
on investment; yet as the venture prospers, the franchisee, in
time, may come to regard the arrangement as onerous, restricting
his profitability.' 15
Rather than focus directly on the balance of power within the relationship, the courts instead have stressed the effect of the agreement on
business independence and freedom of opportunity. 1 6 This formulation raises two obvious questions: what dimensions of independence
are desirable and whose independence and freedom should be promoted? The plaintiff's brief in GTE Sylvania provides one answer to
the first question:
Independent small businessmen who have made an investment of
capital, energy and hope in their own enterprises, ought to be
able to make their own crucial decisions as to where to sell and
what price to charge for their own merchandise, free of coercion,
collusion and exclusionary practices. That is what the free enterprise system, which the Sherman Act protects, is basically about.
This Court has consistently supported that goal of commercial
freedom. .

.

. Sylvania, in Sacramento, displayed consummate

contempt for this Sherman Act goal. If Sylvania's Sacramento
conduct does not invoke the per se rule of Schwinn, neither Sylvania nor any other large firm need in the future doubt its ability
17
to effectively throttle any small buyer with which it deals.'
This statement highlights the confusion that permeates the decisions.
Dealers contract away much of their discretion, not because they are
forced to do so by a powerful manufacturer, but because it is profitable
to do so. Plaintiff's counsel argued, in effect, that dealers should be
given independence in these dimensions whether they want it or notbut they should not be given control of the "crucial decisions" concerning the structuring of the relationship."' Being a dealer entails a set of
115. Id. at 1223.
116. See Bohling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Relational
Power, 53 TEXAS L. REv. 1180, 1190-92 (1975).
117. Brief for Petitioner at 39, Continental T.N., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
For variations on this theme, see id. at 26, 35, 43, 49.
118. That dealers face standard form contracts is not relevant. Franchisors have incentives to
tailor their standard forms to attract franchisees, providing variety and choice at the formation
stage.
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inalienable rights, which might more properly be called inalienable
burdens.
This is not to say that courts should allow dealers to contract away
their discretion in all contexts. Surely, a reasonable court may find
many supposed voluntary agreements objectionable. A slavery contract is an obvious example; another, as I will suggest in the next part, is
a contract giving the franchisor an unlimited right to terminate the
agreement. But restrictions on price and location are typically essential
elements in the package that the dealer is buying.
Nor should courts be indifferent to the "indicia of independent
ownership" stressed by the Supreme Court in both Simpson" 9 and
Schwinn.' 20 The contractual relationships of the parties are embedded
in a larger set of legal relationships. The parties, in effect, contract into
a "status relationship" that determines their obligations to each other
and to third parties.' 2 1 The distinction between independent businessmen (franchisees) and employees often determines whether an individual is covered by workmen's compensation laws, collective bargaining
legislation, social security, and so forth. The indicia of independence
are properly taken into account in determining the boundaries between
these statuses. These demarcations only serve, however, to determine
whether cases should be included in the antitrustjursdiction.2 2 There
is no reason to treat them as determinants of the propriety or legality of
specific behavior or contract terms.
With whose independence and opportunity are the courts concerned? If an exclusive dealing contract is to be unlawful, is it because
of its effect on franchisees or because it limits the opportunity of potential suppliers to sell to these franchisees? Do the courts want to protect
dealers from the power of the franchisor or to protect the business opportunities of potential franchisees and suppliers? The latter concern is
frequently expressed. In its brief in StandardStations,for example, the
Government argued:
Appellant's exclusive dealing contracts completely destroy the
opportunity of other sellers of similar products to compete for the
patronage of the dealer outlets contractually tied to appellants.
In addition, they deprive those outlets of the opportunity to buy
in a competitive market. . . . Agreements which fence off from
119. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 20-24 (1964).
120. 388 U.S. at 381.
121. See Rehbinder, Status Contract,and the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941 (1971).
122. X may be an independent businessman for some purposes and an employee for other
purposes. Cf. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 50, § 114 (discussing the role of status determinations in
applying the doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy).
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constitute in efcompetition a substantial segment of the market
1 23
fect a compulsory boycott of competitors.
The courts have, in fact, given substantial recognition to this interest by
invoking such concepts as "competition on the merits" (to be encouraged), and "foreclosure"1 24 and "clogs on competition" (to be discouraged).
If X agrees to sell a widget to Y,then of course this contract excludes Z from buying X's widget and W from selling its widget to Y.
Exclusion, in this sense, is the essence of contract. The transactions
between X and Z or W and Y could nonetheless take place if the parties are willing to surmount the barriers to exit (incur the costs of
breach). While parties to the widget contract would generally opt for
low barriers, parties to a franchise frequently would not. Exclusion of
outsiders would be a natural result of the structuring decisions of the
contracting parties.
Why should the exclusion of outsiders be cause for concern? Putting aside the concerns about cartel behavior and industry entry barriers,12 5 is there justification for extending protection to the outsiders'
opportunity to compete? Outsider reliance in general should be negligible. If the outsiders have made no investment in reliance on their
ability to deal on reasonable terms with one of the parties, then it is
difficult to justify protecting their interest; exclusion does not entail a
capital loss for the outsiders. A similar insider-outsider distinction
arises in the union-employer relationship. The interests of outside employers (like those of potential suppliers in the present context) typically go unrecognized. 126 The interests of nonunion employees (like
those of excluded potential franchisees) may raise greater difficulties,
particularly if the union employees (franchisees) attain protection
against termination.
The problem of balancing these two conflicting interests is by no
123. Brief for Appellee at 20, Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
124. Attempts by economists to analyze the foreclosure issue in a traditional efficiency framework usually find little or nothing of concern. The courts, however, have typically been concerned
with the boycott-like features of foreclosure.
125. See text accompanying notes 89-96 supra.
126. In the franchise context, the issue of outsider interest frequently arises in connection with
tie-in arrangements, which in effect prevent outsiders from selling certain supplies to the franchisee. See, e.g., FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357
(1965); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.denied,385 U.S. 1002 (1967) (tires,
batteries, and accessories); Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (flour, paper products, and coffee); Siegel v. Chicken Delight,
Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972) (chicken and paper products).

Since many of the tied products are supplies that are not the central element of the franchise
business, the appropriate analogy in the labor union context would be an employer's attempt, for

example, to limit the provision of employee health insurance to one or two insurance companies.
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means an easy one. I suspect, though, that given a proper statement of
the problem, and recognizing the important relational elements of the
franchise agreement, the courts and enforcement agencies can satisfactorily accommodate these interests; the current approach (invocation of
27
the inalienable rights of businessmen) only obscures the conflict.
V.

Termination Protection and the Antitrust Framework

Redressing an imbalance of power in a relationship is certainly not
the only legitimate goal of relational governance. In this section, I posit
another-protecting dealers from termination-and suggest how that
goal might be pursued within the existing antitrust framework.
A.

The Collective Action Puzzle

Left to their own devices, parties would design the franchise agreement so that franchisors could easily terminate the franchisee. Notice
requirements would be short, franchisees would receive little or no
compensation for their reliance, and the franchisor would not have to
prove cause. The franchisees would agree to these terms for a simple
reason: it pays. If the law had initially given potential franchisees the
right to tenure, they would have voluntarily "sold" it to the franchisor
as a condition for entering into the agreement (or else they would have
remained potential franchisees). However, when acting collectively,
through either collective bargaining or political action, they pursue,
and to a substantial degree attain, protection from termination. In this
subsection, I hope to shed some light on this individual/collective di28
vergence.
The initial question is, of course, is there anything to explain?
This itself is a difficult question since it is not easy to characterize that
fictional world in which parties are indeed left to their own devices.
Franchise agreements today inevitably reflect the legal and social context in which they must exist, and that context makes it very difficult
127. Bohling is one of the few commentators who have directly confronted the problem:
In resolving the conflicting interests of existing and aspiring franchisees, the existing
franchisee deserves a favored status. Any existing franchisee has invested time, effort,
and capital in his business that generally cannot be recouped in the event of a termination. An existing franchisee develops certain skills and expertise in his business that may
not be transferable to other enterprises. The aspiring franchisee sustains no comparable
losses if franchisor discretion to terminate is curbed.
Bohling, supra note 116, at 1205.
128. The puzzle emerges in a number of other contexts as well. See, e.g., A. DIcEy, LECTURES
ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 265-66 (2d ed. 1914). Analysis of the question in the franchising context will, I believe, shed

considerable light on the same issues in the employment context.
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for some classes of franchisors (notably automobile manufacturers and
oil companies) to terminate without good cause. We can, however,
draw inferences regarding what a laissez faire contract today would
look like by observing agreements made a few decades ago, when

courts put greater weight on freedom of contract, 29 and by observing

the franchisors' political activity. Casual empiricism suggests that prior
to the 1950s most franchisors (especially in the automobile, gasoline,
and hearing aid industries) considered the right30to terminate on short
notice and without cause extremely important.
One explanation for this divergent behavior is inherent in the nature of relational exchange. At the formation stage parties may deliberately accept terms they do not like, expecting that some of these terms
can later be changed. By entering into a long-term contract, parties in

129. In Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., Inc., 65 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1933), the court
noted:
While there is a natural impulse to be impatient with a form of contract which places the
comparatively helpless dealer at the mercy of the manufacturer, we cannot make contracts for parties or protect them from the provisions of the contracts which they have
made for themselves. Dealers doubtless accept these one-sided contracts because they
think the right to deal in the product of the manufacturer, even on his terms, is valuable
to them; but after they have made such contracts, relying upon the good faith of the
manufacturer for the protection which the contracts do not give, they cannot, when they
get into trouble, expect the courts to place in the contracts the protection which they
themselves have failed to insert.
Id. at 1006. See also Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.
1940). The courts' reluctance to intervene, however, was not absolute. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v.
Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 408-10, 307 A.2d 598, 601-03 (1973):
Where there is grossly disproportionate bargaining power, the principle of freedom
to contract is non-existent and unilateral terms result. In such a situation courts will not
hesitate to declare void as against public policy grossly unfair contractual provisions
which clearly tend to the injury of the public in some way.
We hold. . . that the provision giving Shell the absolute right to terminate on 10
days notice is void as against the public policy of this State.
130. The Ford standard agreement in the 1930s stated: "This agreement may be terminated at
any time at the will" of either party." This clause was included in the contracts litigated in
Kirkmyer and Bushwick-Decatur. See note 129 supra. Some changes were made in the franchise
in 1944 in response to wartime shortages. For details on the wartime experience, see J.
PALAMOUNTAIN, supra note 90, at 156-57; A. SLOAN, MY YEARS WITH GENERAL MOTORS 294
(1963). For an interesting study of the 1956 congressional inquiry into automobile dealership
arrangements, the legislative response, and subsequent events, see S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE
BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS (1966).
While service station franchises have taken a variety of forms, oil companies have generally
maintained the right to terminate quickly; indeed, in many instances the franchisee was also a
lessee and could be terminated on as little as 24 hours notice.
In the hearing aid industry, Dictograph's standard contract, which was typical of contracts in
that industry prior to 1950, required that Dictograph be responsible for certain dealer costs if
Dicfograph initiated the termination. However, an additional clause read: "[I]n event Distributor
for any reason whatsoever violates or breaches this agreement, Company may at its option treat
such a breach as termifiation of this agreement, as though the same were terminated by Distributor." Thus, by finding any violation of the contract by the distributor, the company could avoid
liability yet terminate quickly and cheaply.
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effect buy admission tickets to a game of skill in which they attempt to
revise the rules in their favor without inducing the other party to quit.
The parties can constrain this relational jockeying in their initial structuring decision, but there is no reason to believe they can eliminate it;
nor is there reason to believe that the contracting parties will be equally
vulnerable to redefinition. This explanation may be accurate today,
but it is hard to imagine that franchisees could have had such optimistic expectations about this "game" forty or fifty years ago.
Given individual choice in contract terms, the marginal man will
determine the nature of the contract-the earnings/security combination will be chosen so that the last franchisee is indifferent between his
relationship and the next best alternative. If the differences between
the marginal and average man are systematic, the resultant contracts
will differ. These divergences are likely in the franchise and employment contexts (and no doubt in others). Average existing franchisees
are likely to be older, face higher dislocation costs, and possess more
firm-specific capital than the marginal franchisee. These influences
lead to a greater demand for security when the franchisees act collectively.
Neoclassical economics suggests a simple explanation: collective
action enables franchisees to attain a larger compensation package; the
budget constraint shifts out. Ifjob security is not an inferior good, then
neoclassical economics predicts that franchisees will buy more of it
when acting collectively. While a plausible explanation, I doubt its vaprotection prior to the
lidity. Franchisees did not get much termination
3
mid-1950s, regardless of their buying power. ' '
Collective action does not simply shift the budget constraint out; it
also changes the relative prices facing the parties. That is, the contract
might not require franchisors to prove good cause for termination because enforcement under existing law would be too expensive. The
cost of proving a violation in the available legal forum exceeds the anticipated benefits; collective action, however, can provide a legal forum
at a lower cost to the individual. Further, collective action reduces the
cost of extralegal enforcement. The individual dealer acting alone is in
no position to impose significant costs upon the franchisor. If, however, the individual relationship is linked to other similar ones, the col-

131. A variant of this explanation is more persuasive. If collective action will yield future
rewards to the members of an organization, the individuals will want to increase the likelihood
that they will have the opportunity to capture those rewards. Termination protection is thus a
means for obtaining the fruits of collective action as well as an end in itself.
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lective ability to impose costs through, for example, a strike or boycott
can effectively enforce the individual dealer's agreement.
Thus, Justice Black's language in Perma Life3 2 may not be complete nonsense."' The relative prices of the franchisees' desiderata
vary as a function of the size and cohesiveness of the group. That individual franchisees voluntarily choose contract X does not mean they
would choose that same contract if they faced the relative prices that
obtain when franchisees act collectively. If those prices do differ substantially from those in the individual choice case, then the meaningfulness of voluntary, uncoerced acceptance of contract terms is surely
called into question. Formation stage power in this sense influences
the relative prices facing the parties and hence the terms of the agreement reached.
B. ProtectingDealersfrom Termination
Assuming, then, that franchisees in general want greater protection
from termination, is there any reason for public policy to recognize that
interest? While one could take elements of the preceding discussion
and recast them in terms of social benefits and costs, I prefer to take a
different tack here. Suppose that a franchisor acts in a manner perceived as an abuse of his power, or "unfairly" terminates a dealer.
Rather than remain silent, the dealer may react by imposing costs on
the perpetrator, society at large, or even himself. 134 He may expend an
inordinate amount of resources in response to unfair treatment or the
loss of legitimate rights, whether in a destructive manner or in pursuing
legitimate avenues of political redress.
If everyone passively accepted unfair terminations, the most socially desirable policy 135 would perhaps be to let the parties determine
contractually the franchisee's security. But that is an inappropriate policy when unfair terminations may engender destructive responses. Instead, since the parties' behavior at the formation stage results in
unanticipated costs, we should evaluate policies by taking into account
132. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
133. The interpretation is probably too charitable; the opinion does appear to be genuinely
confused. Nevertheless, if Justice Black's unarticulated assumptions as to the meaning of unequal
bargaining power did encompass the notions developed in the text, his argument makes a bit more
sense (although the decision would still be difficult to justify).
134. The reactions of a party to a contested divorce or a custody battle may be analogous.
Professor Michelman's "demoralization cost" notion, I believe, includes such costs. See
Michelman, Property, Utiity, and Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundationsof "JustCompensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1214-18 (1967).
135. I purposely leave the criteria vague. It may be useful to define "socially most desirable"
in terms of Pareto-superiority, but I want to avoid an unnecessarily narrow definition.
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the additional costs13 6 arising from unfair terminations.
Let me suggest another justification for relational governance that
is a natural extension of the relational exchange approach. Parties to
the social contract face problems of opportunism, changing circumstances, and so forth. They therefore require mechanisms that will,
when necessary, redefine rights in response to, or in anticipation of,
changes in the underlying distribution of power. To cave in to every
threat of violence would, of course, be absurd. To be inflexible would
be equally foolish. In Alfred Marshall's words, "Courage is misapplied
when it struggles against the inevitable."13' 7
The legal process will invariably confront and be forced to resolve
clashes of perceived legitimate interests. Courts or other policymakers
must anticipate changing perceptions of legitimate rights (and the willingness of parties to use extrajudicial means for pursuing them) and
determine how these notions constrain judicial options. Within these
constraints they have some leeway. Mark Tushnet's characterization of
Oliver Wendell Holmes' conception of the judicial role is very much in
this spirit:
To Holmes, judges should determine where power actually
resides in the society and, for essentially Darwinian reasons,
should make decisions that reflect the existing distribution of
power. Although Holmes did not say so explicitly his analysis
suggests that if it is foolish to resist de facto social power, it is
equally foolish to ignore clear indications of change in the distribution of power. Indeed, if judges are to have any creative impact on society, as Holmes thought they should, they must predict
they might facilitate the emergence of nascent
the future so that 38
centers of power.1
I do not intend to describe the process by which legitimate rights
emerge; nor shall I suggest how to determine that a right has emerged
or how to predict which rights will emerge. The arts of lawyering and
136. These costs can be considered externalities. Pigou includes similar costs in his discussion
of the divergence of marginal social and private costs. A. PiGou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE
186 (4th ed. 1962). I am uneasy about using the externality terminology since it evokes from
economists a set of Pavlovian responses that tend to confuse the issue. I anticipate with some
dread a paper on the optimal tax to minimize the excess burden of industrial strife or international
aggression.
137. A. MARSHALL, supra note 32, at 588.
138. Tushnet, The Logic ofExfperience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme Judicial Court,
63 VA. L. REv. 975, 1030 (1977). See also F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). In a similar vein, Edward Banlield argues: "[T]he essential tasks of political leadership ...
are, first, to find the terms on which ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious men will
restrain one another, and, beyond that, to foster a public opinion that is reasonable about what
can and cannot be done to make the society better." Quotedin Wall St. J., June 5, 1978, at 18, col.
5.
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judging consist largely of the application of inchoate rules of thumb in
response to these questions. One can duck these general questions yet
still give reasonably confident answers to specific ones. Thus, it is quite
probably true that in the United States in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the perceived legitimacy of the dealer's right to protection
from termination on other than good faith grounds and limitation of
the franchisor's discretionary power in certain other areas have become
realities to which the law will have to adjust. It is almost certainly true
that we have at least passed the threshold at which a reasonable--or
reasonably innovative-judge could plausibly recognize those restrictions on the franchise relationship.
C Antitrust and Relational Governance
If the law is to provide increased protection to franchisees, it need
not do so under the banner of antitrust. Rather, we might modify contract law or carve out statutory exemptions from it. Indeed, there have
been many attempts outside the antitrust arena to extend protection to
dealers. 139 I am not now advocating that antitrust law incorporate relational governance goals, nor am I now defining or developing those
goals. Rather, I confine my remarks here to the modest question: If
we want to pursue relational governance goals within the existing antitrust framework, how might we do so? If antitrust is to be used as a
tool for relational governance, it is essential that this goal be disengaged from the economist's traditional antitrust concerns. That is,
there should be no need to show public injury or to weave elaborate
fictions as to why certain acts are inherently offensive. 40 If the
franchise relationship concerns only a small part of a franchisee's busi139. Legislation at the federal and state levels has given some protection to automobile dealers, and numerous states have passed legislation protecting service station operators. Legislation
governing other franchise relationships has been proposed; in the 1977-1978 session of the California legislature, 16 bills concerning franchising were introduced, including one that would have
established a Franchise Relations Board-a quasi-judicial board to regulate ongoing franchise
relationships. Courts have also invoked doctrines of good faith and unconscionability to protect
dealers from termination, even though their contracts were apparently terminable at will. See
Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-FranchiseCancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J.
465; Horton, Legal Remedies of a DistributorTerminated Pursuantto a ContractualProvision of
Termination Upon Notice, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 88 (1970); INDUSTRY & TRADE AD., supra note
47, at 20-28. See generally Bohling, supra note 116; Krischer, FranchiseRegulations: AnAppraisal
ofRecent State Legislation, 13 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. Rev. 529 (1972); Comment, A Tempest in a
Chicken Bucket: Some Reflections on FranchiseRegulation in Caiffornia, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1101 (1970).
140. Bohling discusses the demise of the public injury requirement. Bohing, supra note 116,
at 1195-96. Public injury should, of course, remain a requirement if the issue is not one of governance. Bohling also develops a "relational power" test that focuses on the "monopoly" power a
franchisor enjoys in relation to his franchisee. Id. at 1229-40. Market power, as conventionally
defined, is irrelevant.
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ness and he is not extremely vulnerable to termination threats, it seems
reasonable not to extend him protection (Schwinn and GTE Sylvania
would fall in this category). When vulnerability is great, however, and
the potential for explosive conflict is high, the relationship should be
subject to extra-contractual review (automobile dealers and service station operators would fall in this category). Drawing the line between
these categories will not be easy, but making such fine distinctions is
precisely what lawyers do well. The trick is to channel those line-drawing skills so that the distinctions will have some relation to articulated
policy goals.
A terminated dealer can currently bring a private antitrust suit for
treble damages plus legal fees. This penalty is surely excessive if only
relational governance goals are involved. An alternative approach,
which I believe can be implemented without amending the antitrust
laws, begins by confining the treble damages remedy to instances of
public injury. Relational governance can be restricted to section 5 of
the FTC Act, 14 1 which addresses (among other things) "unfair practices." This does not mean, however, that the FTC should adjudicate
all contested franchise terminations. Rather, its primary role should be
suggesting and approving "umpire" or arbitration 142 plans for implementation on a firm or industry level. It might then serve as an appellate body for the disgruntled losers in these semiprivate forums. Or the
plans might be designed to send appeals directly to the courts.
If adverse effects on interbrand competition are possible, then the
courts must consider two trade-offs. First, if a particular act could result both in reduced interbrand competition and more efficient marketing, the courts must balance these two interests. Second, the public
injury goals may conflict with the relational governance goals. (A franchisee "union," like a labor union, might facilitate monopolizing at the
industry level.) 143 Courts could resolve these tensions with a per se rule
prohibiting various vertical restrictions if the franchisor's industry is
concentrated (because a rule of reason examination is likely to be both
141. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979). A finding against the defendant in a § 5
proceeding does not necessarily establish liability for subsequent private treble damage actions.
See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 633 (1974).
142. See Sampson, Arbitration Clauses in DistributionAgreements, 28 Bus. LAW 627 (1973);
Whittaker, The GeneralMotors Dealer Relations Umpire Plan, 28 Bus. LAw. 623 (1973). For a
general discussion of the use of arbitration agreements in extended business relationships, see
Aksen, Legal Considerationsin UsingArbitration Clauses to Resolve Future Problems Which May
Arise During Long-Term Business Agreements, 28 Bus. LAW. 595 (1973).
143. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (agreement between
union and employer-operators to secure uniform labor standards throughout industry not exempt
from antitrust laws).
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expensive and inconclusive). 1" More plausibly, a reasonable weighting of the issues should produce a more tolerant policy, along the lines
suggested by Williamson. 4 5
VI.

Conclusion

I have tried in this essay to shed some light on a woefully confused
area of the law. The analysis of vertical restrictions in antitrust case
law in the years prior to GTE Sylvania has been, to put it charitably,
unimpressive. That poor performance can be attributed, in part, to judicial attempts to pursue relational governance goals while justifying
their decisions on other grounds. Economic analyses in the last two
decades have provided a better understanding of the functional role of
vertical restrictions,14 6 but have generally paid little attention to relational governance issues, treating them either as beyond the proper
scope of antitrust, or as matters to be decided by voluntary agreement
between private parties, or both. 14 7 I believe the relational exchange
framework provides a deeper understanding of the role played by the
various restrictions. I have shown why these issues are of public concern, 148 why they arose in the antitrust context, and how antitrust law
might usefully distinguish them from its other concerns.
I have been more concerned with sorting out the issues than with
advocating a position. There is, as I have tried to make clear, a considerable range over which reasonable people might differ. I hope that
my analysis has enhanced the likelihood that the subsequent debate
will be conducted within that range.

144. See note 6 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 101-03 supra.
146. See R. POSNER, supra note 1; Bork, supra note 5; Bork, supra note 66; Posner, supra note
109; Preston, supra note 66; Williamson, Market Restrictions, supra note 9.
147. See, e.g., Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structureofthe FranchiseContract,21 J.
L. & ECON. 223, 231-32 (1978).
148. Interestingly, this notion of providing extra-contractual protection from termination appears in a number of other long-term relationships. Protection has been forthcoming in the insurance and employment contexts, as well as others. The relatively recent concern for franchisees is,
therefore, hardly an aberration.
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